CHAPTER 12

THE MYTH OF THE CULTURAL COMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Abstract. Cultural issues in international relations form a different picture depending on whether we focus on “relations” or on their “internationality”. One may speak of a culture of international relations, but also of relations that arise between nations characterized in cultural terms – their unique identities. Particularly important among the various ways of understanding culture in the field of international relations is the perseverance of the meaning, which brings culture down to the property of a particular social group – to the cultural community. Such an approach led to one-sided focusing on the differences which form the basis for identity, and on the symbolic borders between different cultures. Criticism of the myth of cultural integration is aimed at the conception of the cultural community as an integrated socio-cultural whole. The field known as international relations should be analyzed as a field of power relations, which are shaped with the help of cultural resources. Despite its initial connotations of harmony and unity, the myth of the cultural community generates conflicts. This chapter attempts to criticize one of the firmly rooted meanings of the term “culture”, pertaining to the unity of lifestyles, values, beliefs and customs. Such holistic comprehension unilaterally imposes the issue of cultural differences, whereas in the global age, many diverse interacting actors participate in the field of cultural meanings. The culture of relations and the global relations of power, including symbolic power, play a key role in the field traditionally known as international relations.

Keywords: cultural community, global culture, European identity, international relations
Culture in the space of international relations

Cultural issues in international relations form a different picture depending on whether we focus on “relations” or on their “internationality”. In English language publications, the term relation can refer both to interactions and to normatively regulated social relations. Here, the term “relations” is used in the sense of both meanings: social interactions and norm-governed relations (Halas 2011: XIV). Thus, one may speak of a culture of international relations, but also of relations that arise between nations characterized in cultural terms, in terms of their unique values and identities.

The concept of the nation carries a huge amount of baggage of diverse theoretical conceptions. It also pertains to the varied and historically changeable realities of collective life. The widely discussed issues of the links between nationality and political society – in other words, the state – are fundamental here. Today, drawing a contrast between the political community and the nation as a cultural community, as Jerzy Szacki shows, is difficult to justify and doubtful, since supporters of the political theory of the nation, which acknowledges the role of the state as a formative factor, also recognize the significance of culture. Furthermore, the concept of national culture remains unclear and problematic (Szacki 2010: 43). As Jerzy Szacki notes, the conception of culture formulated by Johann Gottfried Herder, which remains highly influential – or, more precisely, his conception of national cultures – raises serious doubts, since it is impossible to say what makes these cultures fundamentally different from one another and why these differences “are actually so important, permanent and inalienable” (ibid., 50).

The internal diversity of cultural systems – meanings, values, norms and patterns of action – as well as their openness to change, characteristic of modern nations as opposed to relatively static tribal cultures (Florian Znaniecki wrote about this), makes it impossible to entertain the premise that the cultural community is unified and consistent. As Jerzy Szacki emphasizes, quoting Florian Znaniecki,

Today, in the Global Age, the term “international relations” appears to indicate “a direction to look in” rather than dictating “what to see”, to quote Herbert Blumer’s expression used in a discussion about the problems of defining concepts in the social sciences. Nation-states no longer fill – if they ever did – the space of socio-cultural relations and processes, which are not restricted to a single country. Transnational factors – organizations, social movements and media – transform this space into a new field of ongoing processes and changes. The dualism between “national” and “international” is becoming untenable (Arnholtz 2013: 462). Consequently, there have been attempts to create a new conceptualization of the basic assumptions about international relations and reformulate these assumptions. Of particular interest from the perspective of cultural sociology is the fact that researchers who study international relations tend to focus on the symbolic aspects of power relations; this promotes the application and development of various cultural approaches in regard to these issues. Relying on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice and symbolic power is only one example of such attempts (Adler-Niessen 2012); cultural sociology offers many other approaches, which may be productive as long as – as I show here – one eschews the holistic view of sociology and culture, here termed the myth of the cultural community.

Without a doubt, “globalization” is among the characteristic concepts of postmodernity. As Carl L. Becker reminds us, each historical period has its own keywords: concepts which do not carry a precisely defined meaning, but also do not require one in the context of their use (Becker 1995: 39). In Becker’s opinion, “natural law” in the 18th century, “progress” in the 19th and “relativity” in the 20th were examples of such expressions. Thus, one might ask about the changing roles of the word “culture” during different periods. Along with “civilization”, the word “culture” in its modern sense came into use in the 17th century. It was a manifestation of attempts to rationally
grasp the processes of historical change and evaluate their direction. The terms “civilisation” and “culture” were often used synonymously, but their meanings differentiated over time and “culture” became the master term in social theory.

The Latin root *colere* gave rise to the words “cult” and “colonization”, as well as “culture” (Williams 1985: 87). The latter, so important in modern times, is fraught with ambiguity. Furthermore, in postmodernist critical discourse, culture is frequently linked with cult and colonization, and with a demand for radical changes in the orders of meanings: in other words, a demand for the “cultural turn” as praxis.

Early, 17th-century instances of using the word “culture”, which in those times had a very similar meaning to “civilization”, already referred, more or less implicitly, to international relations. John Milton (1608–1674) in *The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth* (1660) wrote about the spread of culture in the world, understood as the cultural politics of the government (in: Williams 1985: 88).

Particularly important among the various modern ways of understanding culture in the field of international relations is the continuous perseverance of the meaning popularized by Johann Gottfried Herder, which brings culture down to the property of a particular social group: to the cultural community. Distinguishing, as Florian Znaniecki proposed, between a community formed on the basis of culture and a social group that shapes a common culture seems very important, but is not widespread in social theory; hence, this issue will not be discussed in detail here. Immanuel Wallerstein’s position is significant: he expresses the view that the concept of culture is, at present, a key ideological battleground between opposing interests on a global scale (Wallerstein 1990). This view carries important consequences as regards understanding international relations. Wallerstein reduced various definitions of culture to just two, which he considered essential. The first definition, culture as the characteristics or features which distinguish one social
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group from others, is the focus of special attention in this chapter, in the form of the myth of the cultural community. When speaking about the second meaning of culture, Wallerstein refers to the primary, evaluative sense in which the term “culture” appeared in modern times in reference to values held in particularly high regard. Here, it is worthwhile to recall Matthew Arnold’s work *Culture and Anarchy*. Arnold borrowed Jonathan Swift’s metaphor of sweetness and light, referring to beauty and truth as criteria of culture (Griswold 2008: 6). In Wallerstein’s opinion, the concept of the cultural community serves to create an illusion of persistence in a constantly changing world. According to Wallerstein, the evaluative, hierarchical concept of culture is a tool for legitimizing inequalities throughout the world and preserving them. Unity and diversity, universalism and particularism, humanity and race, the world and nations, the person and the man or woman are categories that form binary oppositions, but actually remain in symbiotic relationships: of universalism, but also racism and sexism (Wallerstein 1990: 51). In such a perspective, the United Nations, which bases its actions on the values expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is not a project of global ecumene – a global community of cultural values – since the ideology of universalism, of international law and civil rights, as Wallerstein claims, only serves to mask the hierarchy of states and the hierarchy of citizens within states.

The above-mentioned political critique of the international order shows that, in truth, the concept of culture is crucial for giving direction to modern changes, while their study and solving global problems require an appropriate conceptualization of culture. One of the first scholars to study globalization processes, Roland Robertson, who particularly strongly emphasized the issues associated with their cultural dimension, pointed out that globalization is passing through an “uncertainty phase” which began in the 1960s and is continuing to this day (Robertson 1990: 25nn). According to this author, globalization is a long-term process linked with the beginnings of Western modernity. Its germinal phase lasted from the early 15th
until the mid–18th century; the actual incipient phase stretched from the mid–18th century to the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. During that time, in Robertson’s opinion, the idea of a homogenous nation-state was formed; simultaneously, regulation and formalization of international relations began. Later on, the creation of the League of Nations led to the global spread of the conception of the nation-state and to the popularization of the ideal of national identity. In truth, from the historical perspective, in the short period between 1870 and 1920 globalization passed through the actual take-off phase and subsequently went into the phase in which great powers fought for hegemony, from the early 1920s until the mid–1960s. From the October Revolution, the end of World War I and the inception of the Soviet state, through the great crisis, the development of the totalitarian regimes of Nazism and communism, and finally World War II, international conflicts took place on a global scale. Robertson calls it the struggle-for-hegemony phase and mentions the atomic bomb and the Holocaust as symbols of this struggle, but other symbols should be added, including the Gulag. On the other hand, the present phase of globalization – the uncertainty phase – is marked by the appearance of the idea of multiculturalism and the activity of global social movements which constitute new political subjects and fuel socio-cultural changes. Robertson places particular emphasis on analysing the globalization process in its cultural dimension. This includes seeing the world as an entirety, the meaning of this entirety, the role of competing visions of a global order, and the processes of shaping and negotiating global values and standards.

The cultural community: the limitations of a differentiating conception of culture

The modern idea of multiculturalism and the consequent politics of affirmation, as regards the cultural diversity and distinctive features of various societies, prove that Herder’s view of culture, or rather cultures – since this perspective entails a multitude of
cultures – remains viable. In anthropology, such an approach to the issue of culture led to a one-sided focus on the differences which form the basis for identity, on the symbolic borders between different cultures, as well as on the distinguishing features of familiarity and strangeness. As Margaret S. Archer aptly argued, these conceptions show the presence of a specific cultural archetype which arises from studies of primary societies, where researchers assumed the consistency of all cultural patterns (Archer 1996: 4). When Herder introduced this concept of cultures as integrated wholes, he simultaneously initiated the trend of criticism aimed at Eurocentrism: evaluating different societies’ patterns of life from the perspective of European culture. Thus, Herder’s conception of culture also had an explicit political sense. He wrote:

nothing is more indeterminate than this word, and nothing more deceptive than its application to all nations and periods […]. Men of all the quarters of the globe, who have perished over the ages, you have not lived solely to manure the earth with your ashes, so that at the end of time your posterity should be made happy by European culture. The very thought of a superior European culture is a blatant insult to the majesty of Nature (in: Williams 1985: 89).

Consistency, harmony and the unity of cultures are not only descriptive categories, but also normative ones, indicating the desired state of things, which should be achieved. From the level of traditional, tribal societies, these categories have been transferred to the analysis of contemporary societies, and thus of modern nations. The cultural analysis of social reality, and thus also the analysis of the field of international relations, cannot be limited to the issue of community formation and interactions; when this issue appears, it requires a different perception of cultural phenomena. However, the myth of cultural integration, or the myth of the cultural community, continues to be upheld and remains attractive, even though it actually prevents proper study of the processes of socio-cultural change.
When discussing the myth of cultural integration, Margaret Archer drew attention to the pitfall inherent in a conceptualization of culture which does not allow for the study of the reciprocal constitution of cultural phenomena and social phenomena, since the two are not identical (Archer 1989: 1–21). In other words, relations between culture and society should always be viewed from an appropriate perspective. The point is that all the elements contained within the concept of “society” – social interactions, social roles, institutions, groups and organizations – are culturally constituted and possess meanings which require interpretation. Margaret Archer speaks of a “socio-cultural system” when referring to society and a “cultural system” when examining culture in a narrow sense. This proposal is based on Archer’s theory of socio-cultural change, an example of a conceptualization of culture and society which is based on their analytic differentiation (ibid., 7). Various other ways of theorizing, where this dualism of culture and society is worked out with the aim of maintaining this distinction and emphasizing the autonomy of culture as a narrower, independent domain in regard to society, will not be discussed here. The principle of autonomy lies at the core of the revitalization of cultural sociology (Alexander 2003: 101). However, at this point we should recall Florian Znaniecki’s theory, based on cultural systems of actions and values, where social actions and values lie at the core of social systems, which represent one of the classes of cultural systems, influencing the latter, but without a determining role. Similarly, cognitive, religious, aesthetic, technical, economic and other emergent cultural systems remain relatively autonomous in regard to social systems, relations, roles, groups and broader societies. The author of the pioneering work Modern Nationalities also paved the way for analyses of the world culture society (Znaniecki 1952; Halas 2010).

Criticism of the myth of cultural integration is aimed at the conception of the cultural community as an integrated socio-cultural whole, which would mean an integration of common knowledge
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and common action (Archer 1996: 18). From the classic works of Émile Durkheim to the publications of Clifford Geertz and others, the tradition of cultural research involves using the same models of thinking about reality, which are simultaneously models of action that constitute one whole. Meanwhile, as Archer argues, the cultural orders of meanings and the order of practices, interactions and social relations are rarely united. Alluding to Karl R. Popper, she shows that the order of cultural knowledge involves logical relationships between ideas, whereas in the socio-cultural order, causal relations are characterized by interactions and relationships between individuals and collectivities. An analytical decoupling of these orders and studying their reciprocal relations makes it possible to recognize the social dynamics of culture. Once again, it must be emphasized that not all theories, including Znaniecki’s theory, have copied the myth of cultural integration. In her critique of this myth, Margaret Archer rightly draws attention to the fact that the ideational order – the meanings which give order to the chaos of experiences – is being confused with the order of social actions. The myth of cultural integration has made it impossible to see the inconsistencies in ideational systems. Like Ernest Gellner, Archer shows that it is possible for inconsistent, unclear or even absurd doctrines to reign. This ideational order can develop relatively independently or autonomously in regard to the sphere of social relations and organizations. Similarly, social order doesn’t have to rely on conformism in regard to the valid models of ethos; even praxis need not result from some symbolic universe of discourse.

When criticizing the myth of cultural integration, Archer focuses on the two main theoretical currents – functionalism on one hand, and Marxism on the other – which have upheld and preserved this myth in the realm of the social sciences. Functionalists have argued about the existence and need for top-down merging of culture and society: for an ideational cultural system which would serve as a guide for socio-cultural integration. In the case of Marxism, merging takes place from the bottom up: the social system swallows the
cultural system, which is merely an ideological superstructure for the class structures of social domination.

The analytic dualism of the cultural system and socio-cultural system does not consist in the assumption that these spheres are somehow ontologically distinct. The cultural system is not a consistent symbolic universe and society does not rely on a coherent pattern of a uniform ethos, assimilated in the course of socialization. If one considers, first of all, the fact that in both cases the systems are intelligible – in other words, everything they contain can be understood – then together, they create culture in the broader sense of the word. The important point is to develop conceptions which make it possible to analyse the processes of change, restoring agency to the subjects – both individual and collective – of social life. For instance, attention should be paid to a valuable concept coined by Aili Aarelaid-Tart of making the past usable by various practices to avoid uncertainty by individuals and collectivities (Aarelaid-Tart 2014). Unlike the myth of cultural integration, analytic dualism makes it possible to take into account the cultural determinants of interactions and socio-cultural interactions, which in turn generate changes in the cultural system. The ideational cultural system, together with socio-cultural relations and interactions, are no longer treated as an integrated whole; on each of these levels, processes can take place independently. Relations between the elements of an ideational cultural system may be examined, for example, in terms of syncretism or pluralism, systematization or specialization, whereas the relations between social actors shape the field in the direction of unification or cleavage reproduction or sectionalism (ibid., 270).

Culture and society: the problem of their relationship

Many different ways of abandoning the simplified integrational model of culture and society have been sought. The main outline of the theory of culture and agency developed by Margaret Archer (2013: 7) is one example of such an attempt. The conception of the
cultural community, which assumes an axionormative consensus and a symbolic universe that legitimizes the institutions of this community, obscures that significant dimension of culture which manifests itself in incessant innovations and transformations. Here, one may ask about the cultural structure of the possibility of change: specifically, what elements of culture can be used to elicit a transformation. Shmuel Eisenstadt, with reference to Victor Turner, pointed out the specific “liminality” of culture: symbols imbued with ambivalent meanings of the existing order, areas located between constructs pertaining to structure and constructs of antistructure. According to Eisenstadt, the heterodoxy of beliefs and the sectarianism of social organizations still constitute a prototype of the dynamics of cultural change.

Modern cultural analyses no longer focus on the consensus of cultural communities, but rather on conflicts regarding meanings and the interpretations of these meanings. The metaphor of the cultural community is often replaced by the metaphor of culture as a toolkit, to quote Ann Swidler’s popular expression (Swidler 1986). A related, heuristically interesting approach is Wendy Griswold’s proposal, which also belongs to the paradigm of culture in action (Hałas 2013: 15). Here, culture and society are not only isolated analytically and the latter conceptualized as social worlds; Griswold also introduces communication between the participants in the social world and the creators of culture, placing the produced cultural objects in the centre of her model. In this way, she rules out the conception of a reflection of culture in society or of society in culture, thus avoiding the conflation of culture and society, to use Archer’s expression. The cultural object understood as a shared meaning embodied in form refers both to artefacts available to sensory perception and to ideas or practices (Griswold 2008). A commemorative ceremony, a bill, an international convention, a political treaty and a constitution can all be examples of cultural objects, the meanings of which are associated with various narratives. Around these narratives, different social worlds can form.
The field known as international relations should be analysed as a field of power relations, which are shaped with the help of cultural resources (ibid., 165). Ways of understanding the field of relations, their legitimacy or invalidity, and criteria for their evaluation are derived from existing cultural resources. These relations are formed over time; thus, historical knowledge and social memory are, simultaneously, cultural constructs and resources that help shape relations of which identity politics is an instrument (ibid., 170).

Rituals and spectacles, including those associated with the commemoration of victories and defeats in international relations – or, more broadly, symbolic politics – are among those themes which, in recent times, have made it possible to highlight the presence of culture in politics (Aarelaid-Tart, Kannike 2004). However, identity politics continues to gravitate towards the idea of the cultural community. To quote Wendy Griswold, one may say that “Culture’s role in political life goes well beyond spectacles of power and group membership” (Griswold 2008: 177). One can also view political action as a cultural object, with rivalry going on as to its interpretation through different master frames (Johnston, Aarelaid-Tart 2000). From such a perspective, culture is not a given: it consists of processes of meaning making, in which various possibilities remain open, and the existing cultural knowledge is processed in different ways (Johnston, Klandermans 1995: 5). This approach assumes that worldviews, narratives, practices, symbols and rituals are created and processed through social actions; it is known as the performative approach (ibid., 6) and dates back to the traditions of classic theories of social action. However, as Johnston and Klandermans point out, even when the discussion concerns the cultural changes which social movements wish to bring about, the general image of the socio-cultural whole continues to focus on the idea of a dominant culture, with its codes, values and institutions, which need transforming (Johnston, Klandermans 1995: 4).

The myth of the cultural community, consisting – as Margaret Archer showed – of the unity of “community” and “culture”,
functions not only as the idea of cultural integration – a close relationship between the vision of the world and patterns of action – but also as the conception of a collective cultural identity, which frequently goes hand in hand with that idea. The problematic status of collective memory as the attribute of group consciousness is a particularly good example (Hałas 2012). The fact that such collective notions are rife in the social world doesn’t mean that cultural analysis should be limited or even subordinated to them. More proof of the vitality of the myth of the cultural community is provided by conceptions present on the basis of the scientific discourse which reproduces it, significantly limiting the possibilities of analysing the complexity of the socio-cultural world. Although symbolism, as noted earlier, is crucial in the constitution of the phenomena of social life, the primary symbolic structures of the cultural ethnic community cannot serve as a lens for analyses of the modern forms of collective life. A good example is one of the more attractive modern conceptions associated with the problems of nations and international relations. It consists of the conflation of culture and society.

European identity: does it exist?

Anthony D. Smith takes up the problem of the cultural dimension of European integration. His question about the possibility of the birth of a European identity is posed in a way which automatically implies that the answer, based on the ethnosymbolic premises which he entertains, will be negative. He rightly states that there is no myth of a common European descent, nor any common European memory, nor any sense of a common destiny of European societies. Smith assumes the existence of established national cultures in Europe, woven around primary ethnie, ethnic groups with a common identity and ancestry: in other words, integrated cultural communities. The myth of cultural integration leads to drawing a contrast between national cultures and the project of European unity. It is worth noting that the latter utilizes integrational and community
discourse. The weaker version of the premises of ethnosymbolism implies the homology of the symbolic structure of the nation and the ethnic community, or *ethnie* (Smith 1999: 13). In the stronger version, as stated above, the ethnic community remains at the core of the national community. In both cases, the argumentation refers to wholes, to populations with certain common cultural attributes which form the basis of their identity, and thus are perceived as their defining characteristics, both by the members of those communities and by those who remain outside their borders. Citizens’ common rights and obligations are a new attribute of national communities as compared with the ethnic community, but a common name and memory, common myths, a common culture, a distinct territory and ties of solidarity remain homologous in regard to the ethnic community in this ethno- and nation-centric approach.

“Culture” and “identity” are frequently used interchangeably, both in regard to nations and to Europe (Ifversen 2002). Thus, the myth of the cultural community and cultural integration is also inherent in analyses of the European phenomenon and the project of European integration. National culture and identity, including its ethnocentric matrix of meanings, based on the opposition between identity and difference – in other words, on the contrast with the Other – frequently constitutes a frame of reference for viewing the project of a common Europe in a light similar to the phenomenon of national culture. As Jan Ifversen notes, such a conception of European culture is present in the European Union’s discourse. If the concept of nation encompasses culture, territory and history – in other words, community of language, religion, the customs which constitute tradition, a common past reflected in historical narration and the spatial localization of this culture – then Europe’s greatest problem (if we perceive Europe as akin to national cultures) is culture itself (Ifversen 2002: 9). Simultaneously, one should not minimize the problems of a common European history and memory. As Aili Aarelaid-Tart has argued, a non-unified European memory may contribute to trauma (Aarelaid-Tart 2006). Today, the lack of
a common European language is not without significance if we continue to regard the ethnic or national cultural community as a model of European culture or national culture. However, the values of European culture, such as freedom, equality, rationality, the value of inner life, of everyday life and self-realization (Joas, Wiegandt 2012), and their versatility can be presented on other grounds than the myth of cultural integration.

Anthony D. Smith’s reflections on global culture are another example of how the myth of the cultural community hinders thinking about cultural processes in the space of international relations. He, too, bases his arguments on the differentiating, and hence, particularistic concept of culture. This means that questions about global culture are essentially unfounded, based on an assumption which is inherently contradictory. Thus, as Smith writes, “the idea of a ‘global culture’ is a practical impossibility, except in interplanetary terms” (Smith 1990: 171). One might add: on the basis of the premises of ethnosymbolism and the myth of cultural integration. According to this point of view, by homology, global culture – like ethnic communities and nations, or the problematic European culture – requires three crucial components: a sense of continuity between the experiences of succeeding generations, shared memories and a sense of the common destiny of the collectivity which shares these experiences (ibid., 179). Such a global collective identity seems impossible, and rightly so; however, the concept of global culture remains quite justified and reasonable, as long as we change our understanding of culture. The myth of cultural integration and the cultural community not only lacks the dynamics of modern cultural processes, but actually constitutes a potential threat to civilization when it expresses an

ideal of a global culture which will supersede the many national cultures that still divide the world (ibid., 188).

Thus, while it does not negate the significance of discourse about the cultural values of Europe, Peter Wagner’s reflection is important: if
“globalization” in the cultural sense is a struggle to determine the realities of tomorrow’s world, we ought to consider Europe a place whence might come a proposal of creating a world which, while critically interpreting its own experiences, also refers to them and builds upon them (Wagner 2012: 407).

Despite its initial connotations of harmony and unity, the myth of the cultural community generates conflicts. If culture is understood as the special property of some community, to which this community has an exclusive right, and if these exclusive values distinguish one community from others, then a clash of cultures – or culture shock – becomes inevitable. Zygmunt Bauman observes that the differentiating conception of culture achieved popularity in modern times after the conviction about racial equality became widespread. This observation raises the question of whether the myth of the cultural community poses a threat as a possible substitute for racial differences. Thus, it is doubtful whether, as Bauman claims (Bauman 1999: 29), a differentiating conception of culture, based on the myth of cultural integration, is and should remain an indispensable component of the modern image of the world.

Conclusions

Raymond Williams’s observation referring to the word “culture” in the English language can be extended to all other languages in which it appears. Williams states that the meaning of this word is extremely complicated. It is historically established and changes along with the development of new thought systems. Despite the noun form, it is worth noting that its etymology includes expressions such as cultus agri and cultura animi, which refer to processes. This chapter attempts to criticize one of the firmly rooted meanings of the term “culture”, pertaining to the unity of lifestyles, values, beliefs and customs of some social groups. Such holistic comprehension, leading, in Margaret Archer’s words, to the conflation of culture and society, unilaterally imposes the issue of cultural differences,
whereas in the postmodern world, many diverse interacting actors participate in the field of cultural meanings and the conflicts taking place therein. Some of these actors are new, e.g. transnational social movements and global media, while all of them utilize existing cultural resources and create new ones. Thus, the culture of relations and the global relations of power, including symbolic power, play a key role in the field traditionally known as international relations.

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